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CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

1.

Undersigned counsel has been appointed as amicus curiae

to address the question posed to the parties in the United States Court of
Appeals’ Order dated September 19, 2008.
2.

The undersigned counsel is a professor of law at The John

Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois, and no other attorneys have
appeared or are expected to appear with him as amicus curiae.
3.

The undersigned counsel appears as an individual by

appointment of the Court and does not appear on behalf of The John
Marshall Law School which takes no position in these matters before the
Court.
4.

The undersigned counsel was assisted by Nicole Renchen,

a second-year student at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois.

______________________________
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Professor of Law
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I. Statement of Interest
The Court appointed Gerald E. Berendt amicus curiae on September
19, 2008, to address the question of whether, assuming the applicability of

Garmon preemption, the court ought to treat the allegations contained in the
count alleging a violation of the Illinois antitrust statute as also stating a
federal claim under 29 U.S.C. § 187.

II. Introduction and Summary of Argument
The district court denied Appellant’s motion for leave to amend his
complaint which included an allegation that the Appellee Union violated the
Illinois Antitrust Statute. The district court correctly concluded, inter alia,
that the Appellant’s state antitrust claim was preempted by Section
8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(2008).

Accordingly, the district court granted the Appellees’ motion to

dismiss and ordered the Appellant’s claims dismissed with prejudice. The
Appellant appealed this dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
The parties and the district court were apparently unaware of the
possible availability of a claim by the Appellant under Section 303 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2008), which would also
have served to preempt the state antitrust claim.

The Appellant’s state

antitrust law allegation did not give the Appellees fair notice of a possible
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claim based on Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, and
therefore did not state a claim of a violation of the latter federal law.
However, since the district court and the parties were unaware of a possible
claim under Section 303, the Appellant is appearing pro se, and there would
be little prejudice to the Appellant, the court of appeals may consider
reversing and remanding to the district court to permit the Appellant to
amend his complaint to allege a claim founded in Section 303 of the LaborManagement Relations Act.

III. Argument
A.

The United States Supreme Court’s Garmon Doctrine Operates
to Preempt Appellant’s Count Alleging a State Antitrust Law
Violation.

The

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Seventh

Circuit

has

ordered

supplemental briefs on the following issue: Whether, assuming the
applicability of Garmon preemption, the court ought to treat the allegations
contained in the count alleging a violation of the Illinois Antitrust Statute
(740 ILCS 10/2 (2008)), as stating a claim under Section 29 U.S.C § 187
(2008). The court’s question assumes the applicability of Garmon preemption
to the Appellant’s Count 1, alleging a violation of the Illinois antitrust
statute. Nevertheless, to answer the court’s precise question, it is instructive
to review the Garmon labor preemption doctrine.

2

In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),
the United States Supreme Court held that the states are preempted from
exercising jurisdiction in cases arising from peaceful picketing where such
picketing is regulated by federal labor law. 359 U.S. at 246.

This labor

preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution (U.S. CONST. ART. VI.), and has been developed by the federal
courts in order to prevent state regulation from conflicting with national
labor policy as set forth in federal statutes and further developed by the
National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts. 359 U.S. at 247.
In Garmon, a union picketed an employer to compel that employer to
execute a union-shop agreement with a minority union. 359 U.S. at 237. The
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) declined to assert jurisdiction over
the matter, but a California state court did. The California court concluded
that the union had violated state tort law and a state labor code, awarding
damages. The United States Supreme Court reversed. 359 U.S. at 246.
Holding the state action preempted, the Court announced a test governing
when such preemption would occur:
When an activity is arguably subject to Section 7 or Section 8 of
the [National Labor Relations] Act, the States as well as federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if
the danger of state interference with national labor policy is to
be averted…. If the Board decides, subject to appropriate
judicial review, that conduct is protected by Section 7, or
prohibited by Section 8, then the matter is at an end, and the
States are ousted of all jurisdiction.”
359 U.S. at 244-45.
3

The NLRB had not adjudicated the legality of the union’s conduct for
which the State court sought to provide a remedy in damages. Nevertheless,
the Garmon court concluded that State jurisdiction was displaced since the
union’s activity arguably fell within “the compass of Section 7 or Section 8 of
the Act.” 359 U.S. at 246. The Garmon court acknowledged that the states
remained free to regulate “where the activity regulated was a merely
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act”… “[o]r where the
regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we
could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.”
359 U.S. at 243-44.
The facts in the instant case support the assumption stated in
this court’s question presented to the parties and Amicus Curiae for
briefing, i.e., that the Appellant’s allegation of a violation of the Illinois
antitrust statute is preempted under Garmon.

The Appellant has

alleged that the Union in this case violated Section 3 of the Illinois
Antitrust Act, engaging in a wrongful restraint of trade or elimination
of competing business interest, by its threatening and coercive
behavior towards the Appellant’s client in attempts to make the client
hire a union electrician instead of the Appellant. Appellant’s Appendix.
That conduct also arguably falls within the proscription of the National
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Labor Relations Act. 359 U.S. at 244-45. Indeed, the Appellant also
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations
Board alleging, in relevant part, that the Union violated Section
8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(2008)), by inducing or encouraging Appellant’s customers to cease
doing business with the Appellant in order to compel the Appellant to
recognize and bargain with the Union, in other words to become a
union contractor. Appellant’s Appendix.
Not only are the facts alleged in the State antitrust allegation identical
to those Appellant alleged in the unfair labor practice proceeding, but the
Appellant’s characterization of those facts as a violation of the respective
state and federal laws is virtually identical as well. Thus, the Appellant’s
allegation of a state antitrust violation concerns a matter at least arguably, if
not actually, prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations
Act, inviting federal preemption of the state law allegation under the Garmon
doctrine unless one of the two exceptions is made out. 359 U.S. at 243-44.
As the district court concluded, the Union’s alleged conduct was not of
mere peripheral concern to the National Labor Relations Act but strikes at
the heart of Congress’ concern to prohibit certain forms of secondary boycotts.
Indeed, the centrality of the federal concern to prohibit such conduct is
reflected in the settlement of the unfair labor practice charge. The Appellee
Union agreed to post notice that it will not coerce others to force the customer

5

in question from doing business with the Appellant. Although the Union
maintains it had a non-admissions clause in its settlement with the NLRB,
this settlement and the concomitant posted notice further indicate the matter
was at least arguably, if not actually, prohibited by the National Labor
Relations Act.
The union conduct alleged in the state antitrust claim implicates one of
the federal law’s primary objectives, to protect neutrals from secondary
pressure that would enmesh them into disputes between others. R. L.

Coolsaet Constr. Co. v. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers., 177
F.3d 648, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004. Irrespective of
any deep local feelings regarding the potential restraint of commerce and
trade, the NLRA prohibition is clearly directed at the very same conduct
targeted by the state law, which accordingly must give way, preempted due to
federal supremacy. U.S. CONST. ART. VI. As the United States Supreme
Court observed when comparing federal and state antitrust laws in Connell

Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Union Local Union No. 100,
State antitrust laws generally have not been subjected to
this process of accommodation. If they take account of
labor goals at all, they may represent a totally different
balance between labor and antitrust policies. Permitting
state antitrust law to operate in this field could frustrate
the basic federal policies favoring employee organization
and allowing elimination of competition among wage
earners, and interfere with the detailed system Congress
has created for regulating organizational techniques.
421 U.S. 616, 636 (1975).

6

Nor does the availability of different remedies under the state
antitrust law compared to the National Labor Relations Act justify an
exception to the Garmon preemption doctrine. In Wisconsin Department of

Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court held preempted a Wisconsin law that forbade
state government procurement of goods from firms that had committed
multiple violations of the National Labor Relations Act.

The Court

characterized the state law as providing a supplemental remedy for violations
of the National Labor Relations Act, comparable to the state civil damages for
the picketing held preempted in Garmon. 475 U.S. at 287. The Supreme
Court explained:
Indeed, “to allow the State to grant a remedy … which
has been withheld from the National Labor Relations
Board only accentuates the danger of the conflict,” …
because “the range and nature of those remedies that are
and are not available is a fundamental part” of a
comprehensive system established by Congress.”
475 U.S. at 287, quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247 and Amalgamated

Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971).

The Supreme Court later distinguished its Gould decision from
situations where the state is a market actor rather than acting as a regulator
of the conduct in question. Building & Construction Trades Council of the

Metropolitan

District

v.

Associated

Builders

and

Contractors

of

Massachusetts/ Rhode Island (Boston Harbor case), 507 U.S. 218, 230 (1993).
In the instant case, however, there is no allegation that the Illinois Antitrust
7

Act is an exercise of the State of Illinois’ role as a market actor. Thus, the
market actor distinction announced in the Boston Harbor case is inapplicable
in the instant case.
Any doubt the Boston Harbor case may have cast on the continuing
viability of the Gould precedent has been dispelled by the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce of the United

States of America v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). There, the United States
Supreme Court held preempted provisions in a California statute, prohibiting
employers receiving certain state funds from using such funds to assist,
promote or deter union organizing. 128 S. Ct. at 2417. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to reach the question of possible preemption under

Garmon, concluding instead that the state laws were preempted under a
second labor preemption test, Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427
U.S. 131 (1976), because the state laws sought to regulate within “a zone
protected and reserved for market freedom.”

Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2412,

quoting the Boston Harbor case, 507 U.S. at 226. However, in the course of
applying the Machinist test, both the majority and the dissenters cited the

Gould case with approval.
The Garmon labor preemption doctrine applies in this case.
Accordingly, the Appellant’s allegation that the Appellee Union violated the
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Illinois antitrust statute is preempted by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act.

B.
Although Not Addressed by the District Court,
Appellant’s State Antitrust Law Claim Is Also Preempted by
Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
The Appellant’s allegation of a state law violation would also likely be
preempted by Section 303 of the federal Labor-Management Relations Act (29
U.S.C. § 187 (2008)). Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v.

Morton Trucking Co., 377 U.S. 252 (1964). Neither the Appellee Union nor
the district court below raised this possibility. However, the court of appeals’
Order, directing the filing of supplemental briefs, discloses that this court
observed the availability of a Section 303 action under which the Appellant
could seek compensatory damages under the federal law.
There are significant differences in the remedies available under the
Illinois Antitrust Act compared to those available under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act and Section 303 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act. In addition to providing for criminal actions and penalties,
(740 ILCS 10/6 (2008)), the Illinois Antitrust Act provides for civil actions and
remedies in the event of violation. 740 ILCS 10/7 (2008).

In the instant

case, the Appellant seeks civil remedies under Section 7(2) of the Illinois
Antitrust Act which provides in relevant part:
Any person who has been injured in his business or property, or
is threatened with such injury, by a violation of Section 3 of this
9

Act may maintain an action in the Circuit Court for damages, or
for an injunction, or both, against any person who as committed
such violation… In an action for damages, if injury is found to be
due to a violation of subsections (1) or (4) of Section 3 of this Act,
the person injured shall be awarded 3 times the amount of
actual damages resulting from that violation, together with
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. If injury is found to be due
to a violation of subsections (2) or (3) of Section 3 of this Act, the
person injured shall recover actual damages caused by the
violation, together with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and
if it is shown that such violation was willful, the court may, in
its discretion, increase the amount recovered as damages up to a
total of 3 times the amount of actual damages….
740 ILCS 10/7(2) (2008).
For a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board ordinarily issues a cease and desist
order with an order to post notice. When a complaint has issued alleging a
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, the NLRB must petition an
appropriate federal district court for injunctive relief pending final
adjudication of the matter. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2008).
Significantly, Congress also provided a separate cause of action for
damages, for victims of such violations of Section 8(b)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act. Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
provides:
Unlawful activities or conduct; right to sue; jurisdiction;
limitations; damages
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section
only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for
any labor organization to engage in any activity or
conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section
158(b)(4) of this title.
10

(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property
by reason or any violation of subsection (a) of this section
may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States subject to the limitations and provisions of section
185 of this title without respect to amount in controversy,
or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties,
and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the
cost of the suit.
29 U.S.C. § 187 (2008).
Under Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, courts
have awarded compensatory damages that are proximately caused by the
union wrongdoing. Accordingly, the victim of an unlawful secondary boycott
is entitled to a reasonable approximation of damages actually incurred as a
result of the union’s unlawful activity. Boxhorn’s Big Muskego Gun Club, Inc.

v. Electrical Workers Local 494, 798 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1986). At trial, a
plaintiff may establish by competent evidence damages based on sales lost
due to the unlawful conduct of the union. See, e.g., J. Pease Construction Co.

v. Local 150, International Union of Operating Engineers, No. 87 C 10515,
1992 WL 77731 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In addition, plaintiff may recover for lost
profits if plaintiff establishes such damages are not speculative. Beelman

Truck Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union
No. 525, 33 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 1994). Punitive damages are not available
under Section 303. Morton Trucking Co., 377 U.S. at 260 (1964). For a
discussion and examples of compensatory damages recoverable under Section
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303 of Taft-Hartley, see Higgins, The Developing Labor Law Vol. II 18591865 (5th Ed. 2006).
In Count 1 of his Amended Complaint, Appellant expressly alleges a
violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/2 (2008). On page 9 of
that Amended Complaint, Appellant states:
Wherefore, the Plaintiff prays that the court find the
Defendants responsible for the following:
A. Treble damages as allowed by the statute.
B. Costs of the suit.
C. Compensatory Damages to the Plaintiff, for
damages to his credit and reputation that has restricted
his ability to
bid.
D. Compensatory Damages to the Plaintiff for
stress put upon the Plaintiff and his family, due to the
bankruptcy of
his company and his inability to
continue to employ
his
son-in-law,
Robert
Thompson.
E. Compensatory Damages for all court costs and
attorney
fees, and traveling expenses to court and
attorneys offices from March 1999 to present.
For these reasons and to protect the rights of the
public to free commerce and to Compensate the Plaintiff
for the damages listed above, The Plaintiff Prays that
this court award him the amount of TWELVE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. (Bold and
capitals in original) Appellant’s Appendix.
Appellant’s express prayer for “[t]reble damages as allowed by the
statute” clearly refers back to his Count 1 allegation of a violation of the
Illinois Antitrust Act which provides for such damages.
12

Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides a federal
action for victims of secondary boycotts to obtain compensatory damages
caused by a union’s conduct.

In addition to being preempted by Section

8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Appellant’s state antitrust
claim is also preempted by Section 303 of the federal law.

C.
Appellant’s Count Alleging a Violation of the Illinois
Antitrust Statute is Not the Equivalent of Stating a Claim
Under Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
There remains the precise question on which this court sought
additional briefs: Whether assuming the applicability of Garmon preemption,
the court ought to treat the allegations contained in the count alleging a
violation of the Illinois antitrust statute as stating a claim under 29 U.S.C. §
187 (2008), also known as Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, familiarly known as Taft-Hartley. Drawing from the most recent case
law regarding federal pleadings, the answer is no. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th
cir. 2008); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Concentra Health

Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). Although Amicus Curiae is not
an expert in federal pleadings law and practice, he will address this issue.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
plaintiff’s complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Whether

13

the plaintiff has done so may be tested in a defendant’s motion to dismiss
based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Prior to 2007, the standard applied by the federal courts was that
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957): “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 355 U.S. at 45-46.
The Conley Court cited with approval Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d
774 (2nd Cir. 1944). In that case, a pro se plaintiff sued a customs collector,
alleging a confusing set of facts to the effect that the collector had auctioned
off his merchandise for less than the bid for it and that plaintiff’s goods, two
cases of tonics, disappeared three weeks before the sale. The plaintiff filed an
amended complaint that was hardly more coherent, and the district court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, the court of appeals
characterized the pro se plaintiff’s brief as “a recital of facts, rather than an
argument of law.” 139 F.2d at 775.

Nevertheless, the court of appeals

reversed and remanded, reasoning:
We think that, however inartistically they may be
stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims that
the collector has converted or otherwise done away
with the two cases of medicinal tonics and has sold
the rest in a manner incompatible with the public
auction he had announced – and, indeed, required
… by Treasury Regulations….
139 F.2d at 775.

14

In 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp., the United States Supreme Court
observed that the “no set of facts” language in Conley could be read “as
saying that a statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings….” 127
S. Ct. at 1968. In Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court expressed concern that
under Conley, “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a
plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support
recovery.” 127 S. Ct. at 1968. The Court then declared that Conley’s often
quoted “no set of facts” passage had “earned its retirement.” 127 S. Ct. at
1969. Instead, the Supreme Court looked “for plausibility” in the complaint
in Bell Atlantic and concluded that the plaintiff’s claim that defendant had
engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade fell short. 127 S. Ct. at 1970.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has had occasion to
interpret and apply the Bell Atlantic decision in recent months. Notably in

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, the court of appeals cautioned that “the Court in Bell
Atlantic made clear that it did not, in fact, supplant the basic notice-pleading
standard.” 526 F.3d at 1083. The court of appeals then declared, “A plaintiff
still must provide only enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and, through his
allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he
is entitled to relief.” 526 F. 3d at 1083 (quotations and citations omitted).
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Quoting its 2007 decision in Concentra, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit then described a two-part test drawn from the Bell Atlantic opinion.
First, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient
detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests. Second, its
allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a
right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative
level”; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.
526 F.3d at 1084.
The Tamayo Court further explained that to survive dismissal, the
complaint need not describe the allegations against the defendant with the
specificity required at the summary judgment stage. “In these types of cases,
the complaint merely needs to give the defendant sufficient notice to enable
him to begin to investigate and prepare a defense.” 526 F.3d at 1085.
The court of appeals then applied this two-part test and concluded that
plaintiff Tamayo had stated claims for sex discrimination and retaliation for
filing EEOC charges. 526 F.3d at 1085. Plaintiff Tamayo’s other allegation,
that she was treated adversely due to her political affiliation in violation of
her First Amendment rights, did not foreclose the possibility that she could
plausibly recover under her discrimination and retaliation claims. 526 F.3d
at 1086. In so reasoning, the court of appeals stated, “Although our pleading
rules do not tolerate factual inconsistencies in a complaint, they do permit
inconsistent legal theories.” 526 F.3d at 1086.
In the instant case, the Appellant’s Count 1 factual allegations
plausibly state a claim for a violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act.
16

Appellant’s Amended Complaint. However, as recounted above, that claim
was preempted by federal labor law under the Garmon doctrine. The
Appellant expressly stated his first count as a violation of the state statute
and sought relief as provided in that statute. To date, the Appellant has
made no reference to Section 303 of Taft-Hartley and has never couched his
prayer for relief in terms of that federal law. Thus, Appellees’ motion to
dismiss, as well as the district court’s decision, dealt with the Appellant’s
first count on its own express terms, that is, whether Appellant had a
plausible claim under the Illinois Antitrust Statute.

The district court

concluded he did not, due to federal preemption.
Appellant’s Count 1 allegations do allege conduct by the Appellee
Union that would make out some of the elements of a secondary boycott
under both Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act and Section
303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. However, no reference is made
to the Section 8(b)(4)(B) charge that Appellant filed with the NLRB nor to the
Appellee Union’s settlement with the NLRB.

The Defendants-Appellees

would reasonably understand these facts to allege only a violation of the state
antitrust statute, as Appellant expressly stated in paragraph 15 of his
Amended Complaint. Appellant’s Appendix.
In his Amended Complaint, Appellant apparently attached copies of
the Section 8(b)(4)(B) charge he filed with the National Labor Relations
Board and the Notice posted by the Appellee Union pursuant to its
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settlement with the NLRB. However, in Count 1 of his Amended Complaint,
Appellant expressly stated his allegation of a violation of the Illinois
Antitrust Statute and sought treble damages for the violation of that state
law.

Appellant’s Appendix. Appellant neither referred to federal law nor

limited his prayer for relief to compensatory damages which would be
recoverable under Section 303 of Taft-Hartley.
In addition to treble damages, Appellant sought compensatory
damages “for damages to his credit and reputation that has restricted his
ability to bid,” “for stress put upon Plaintiff and his family, due to the
bankruptcy of his company and his inability to continue to employ his son-inlaw,” and for court costs, attorneys fees and travel expenses. Appellant’s
Amended Complaint 9-10. However, the Appellant did not indicate that the
relief sought by his prayer for these “compensatory damages” was a remedy
for the alleged antitrust violation or one of his other counts. However, given
Appellant’s express prayer for “[t]reble damages as allowed by statute,”
Defendants-Appellees were reasonable in understanding that PlaintiffAppellant’s claim was based in the state antitrust statute and would not
think Appellant made a Section 303 claim under the federal Taft-Hartley
law.
It might be argued that the Appellee Union is represented by
experienced labor counsel who should have been aware that Appellant had a
possible Section 303 claim in addition to the Section 8(b)(4)(B) charge that
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Appellant filed with the NLRB.

That argument is based on speculation.

Moreover, even if counsel for the Appellee Union was aware of the available
Section 303 action, it raises the question of whether opposing counsel had
responsibility, ethically or otherwise, to so advise the Appellant.

Amicus

Curiae is not prepared by way of experience or expertise to address this
question. Due to the speculative nature of this possible argument, Amicus
Curiae would not make the leap and conclude that because opposing counsel
is an experienced labor lawyer, Appellee Union would have notice that the
state antitrust violation count states the equivalent of a federal Section 303
claim.
The closest the Appellant has come to stating a claim based in Section
303 of Taft-Hartley is in his passing references to his unfair labor practice
charge filed with the NLRB and the subsequent settlement between the
NLRB and the Appellee Union. Nevertheless, in this case the Appellant has
not associated his unfair labor practice charge, the later settlement and the
consequent posting of notice with his allegation that Appellee Union violated
the state antitrust law. Thus, based on Appellant’s Count 1, the DefendantsAppellees would not have notice that the state antitrust claim was the
equivalent of a Section 303 claim under the federal law.
It may be argued that the permissive pleadings approach embraced by
the court of appeals in Dioguardi remains viable even after Bell Atlantic,
because Dioguardi may be distinguished from Bell Atlantic. The plaintiff in
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Dioguardi alleged facts without a legal theory whereas the plaintiff in Bell
Atlantic alleged a legal theory without stating facts to make the claim
plausible. However, it should be noted that unlike the pro se plaintiff in

Dioguardi, the pro se Appellant in this case did provide a legal theory, i.e., a
violation of the state antitrust law. In this case, the Appellant’s pleadings
stated one legal theory, the preempted state antitrust law claim, made no
reference to a possible federal Section 303 claim, and effectively led the
Defendant’s and the district court’s attention away from the possible Section
303 claim.
Accordingly, the Appellant’s Amended Complaint failed to give
Defendants fair notice of a claim based in Section 303 of Taft-Hartley. This
leaves the Appellant without a federal claim. In the jurisdictional statement
in Appellees’ Brief, Appellees state that “[t]he District Court’s jurisdiction
was based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because
Plaintiff’s state law legal malpractice and malicious prosecution claims are
completely preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.” The Appellees then state, “The District Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’ state law antitrust claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1367.” Appellees’ Brief 1. Thus, it appears that any federal questions were
raised by way of defense and not in the Plaintiff’s allegations. Nor does the
Appellant set forth the rudiments of diversity jurisdiction in his Amended
Complaint, since he referred to state residence as opposed to state
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citizenship. Further, to the extent that Appellant’s allegations may be taken
as referring to state citizenship, there does not appear to be complete
diversity of citizenship of the parties. Appellant’s Amended Complaint 1-2.
The court of appeals may raise sua sponte the issue of federal subject matter
jurisdiction in this litigation.

D.

Although Appellant Has Not Alleged a Claim Based on
Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, the
Court of Appeals Could Reverse and Remand for
Dismissal Without Prejudice or to Permit the Pro Se
Appellant to Amend His Complaint.

If this court concludes that Appellant’s allegation of a state antitrust
violation was not the equivalent of a claim under Section 303 of Taft-Hartley,
it may not be too late for Appellant to file such a claim independently. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that Section 303 actions
are governed by Illinois’s five-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

BE&K Construction v. Building Trades Council (Will & Grundy Counties),
156 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1998). 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (2008). It has been
held that the statute of limitations for a Section 303 claim begins to run only
when the damages become reasonably ascertainable.

Chester Railing v.

United Mine Workers of America, 445 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1971). Although it is
not entirely clear when all of the events relating to the alleged secondary
boycott occurred in this case, Appellant filed his unfair labor practice charge
alleging a secondary boycott on July 12, 2004.
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Presumably, the alleged

unfair labor practice and resulting injury to the Appellant did not cease until
the Appellee Union entered the subsequent settlement agreement with the
NLRB and posted notice.

Thus, the five-year statute of limitations for a

Section 303 action may not have run.
It would not be “necessary that the union must have violated an NLRB
order before the employer was entitled to institute, and successfully
maintain, its suit for damages under section 303.” Plumbers & Fitters, Local

761 v. Matt J. Zaich Constr. Co., 418 F.2d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1969).
However, establishing the elements of a violation of Section 8(b)(4) of the
NLRA would be necessary in a private action for damages under Section 303
of Taft-Hartley. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150,

AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1034 (7th Cir. 2006). See also, Chicago Dist.
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Reinke Insulation Co., 464 F.3d 651,
657-59 (7th Cir. 2006); Mautz & Oren, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, etc., Local No. 279, 882 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir. 1989).
To the extent that a ruling in the present appeal may render any other
claims arising from the same set of facts res judicata, the court of appeals
may wish to take into account that the Appellant has appeared pro se during
this litigation. Appellant was apparently unaware of the possible federal
preemption of the state antitrust claim when he brought it.

Nor was

Appellant aware of the availability of the federal Section 303 Taft-Hartley
right of action until this court of appeals issued its order for supplemental
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briefs on the question presented.

Although the Diogaurdi case may be

distinguishable from the instant case as explained in Argument “C” above,
this court of appeals may be inclined to embrace its spirit of leniency for pro

se complainants. Thus, the court of appeals may wish to be lenient with the
pro se Plaintiff-Appellant, and reverse and remand to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the Appellant’s claims without prejudice, in order to
permit the Appellant to file a new claim based on Section 303 of the LaborManagement Relations Act. Alternatively, the court of appeals may reverse
and remand to permit the Appellant to amend his complaint in the present
action to allege a Section 303 of Taft-Hartley claim. "Instead of lavishing
attention on the complaint until the plaintiff gets it just right, a district court
should keep the case moving." Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th
Cir. 1998). See also, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Concentra

Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2007).
The Appellees would suffer little prejudice were the court of appeals to
remand to the district court to permit the Appellant to amend his complaint.
This litigation is not an antitrust action or the sort of complex case that has
or would subject the Appellees to extensive and expensive discovery to
prepare its defense to a Section 303 action.

Indeed, the elements of an

alleged Section 303 action are the same as those of the unfair labor practice,
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA, that the Appellee Union settled with the
NLRB. Moreover, it appears that many of the documents supporting the
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elements of an alleged unlawful secondary boycott have already been
provided by the Appellant to the Appellees in the appendices to the
Appellant’s various filings.
Reversal and remand would do more than simply afford the pro se
Appellant another chance to pursue recovery. Permitting the Appellant to
amend his complaint, or dismissing his present claim without prejudice,
would serve the public interest by educating the Appellant and potential
plaintiffs in similar situations of the preemptive effect of the federal labor
laws and the availability of a private action under Section 303 of the LaborManagement Relations Act.
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Conclusion
The Appellant’s allegation that the Appellee Union’s conduct violated
the Illinois antitrust statute is preempted by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act and also by Section 303 of the LaborManagement Relations Act. Appellant’s allegation of the state antitrust law
violation and his prayer for treble damages did not afford the Appellee Union
fair notice of a claim founded in Section 303 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act. Nevertheless, the court of appeals should take into account
that the parties and the district court were apparently unaware of the
availability of a Section 303 action, and that the Appellant is appearing pro

se. There will be little prejudice to Appellees if the court of appeals reverses
and remands to the district court to permit the Appellant to amend his
complaint by alleging a claim under Section 303 or for the district court to
dismiss Appellant’s present action without prejudice.
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